Weekly Summary:
Dozens of military figures have been arrested in Mali in recent days. The government has remained silent on the detentions, which were likely triggered by a coup plot or an internal power struggle. In recent months, political repression and insecurity have worsened in the country.
Tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been heightened for months, worsened by political infighting in Tigray. While some fear conflict between the two neighbours is on the horizon, others remain doubtful.
Niger recently announced the formation of Garkouwar Kassa, an initiative to recruit, train, and arm civilian volunteers. Bearing similarities to Burkina Faso’s VDP, the move could potentially worsen Niger’s security crisis.
Somaliland’s bid for recognition as an independent state may soon pay off, with the US reportedly considering its claims. Fighting between the federal government and Jubaland re-erupted, while Mogadishu claimed an important victory over al-Shabaab.
Mass protests took place in Côte d'Ivoire in response to President Ouattara’s plans to run for a fourth term along with the banning of four key opponents.
Mass Arrests in Mali Signal Internal Discontent
Mali’s President Assimi Goita appears to have faced one of the most significant challenges to his rule in the past week. Over the weekend, reports emerged that dozens of officers in the armed forces had been detained for allegedly seeking to destabilise the country. In the following days, rumours surfaced that the ruling regime had arrested even more members of the military. Despite this purported internal turmoil, the government has remained mysteriously silent.
The government’s refusal to acknowledge or refute the reports is perhaps telling, yet it also leaves the outside world with few, if any, verified facts about this ongoing saga. Information from news outlets and local sources suggests that a wave of arrests has almost certainly rocked the military, yet why they occurred remains unclear. It is also widely believed that General Abass Dembele and General Nema Sagara are among the most high-profile detainees, but even these reports are not entirely confirmed.
The arrests can likely be explained by one of two theories, or perhaps a third containing elements of both. The first, and seemingly prevailing, theory is that President Goita recently uncovered a plot to depose him. The second suggests an internal power struggle occurring at the highest levels, which led Goita to purge the military of opponents and preempt threats to his rule.
The backgrounds of Gen. Dembele and Gen. Sagara add useful context to the murky situation. Gen. Dembele is a popular figure in the military and well-known for his brave heroics fighting jihadists in 2012 and 2013. He also served as governor of the Mopti region, one of the epicentres of Mali’s security crisis, from 2020 to 2025, where he reportedly earned similar respect from local civilians for his style of governance. However, he was removed from his position in May for unknown reasons. Gen. Sagara is famous for being one of the highest-ranking women in the armed forces, she too fought on the frontlines for her country, and both her sister and father have held important roles in the military.
The profiles of these two figures could support either theory. Nonetheless, the motives for a coup attempt or a power struggle likely arise from the same conditions. Instead of returning Mali to civilian rule as once promised, President Goita recently extended his rule for another five years and banned all political parties - a move which triggered rare protests.
The leader came to power amid widespread discontent over Mali’s worsening insecurity, caused by the spread of extremist violence from the north to the centre of the country. Since taking rule, jihadists have now moved westward and begun threatening some of Mali’s key economic assets - a development with potentially far-reaching consequences. Moreover, with militants present in all corners of the country, the risks facing troops on the frontline continue to grow with no end in sight.
What the future holds for President Goita remains uncertain, while he may emerge from the crisis in a stronger position than before, some have speculated that the silence of his government signals that his power is far from guaranteed. One near certainty is that any significant political instability would be immediately exploited by militant groups, who aim to fundamentally alter the country and the wider region.
Heightened Tensions Between Eritrea and Ethiopia
Several days ago, Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party warned that external forces are attempting to push the country into conflict. It has made this accusation on many an occasion, each time not so subtly taking aim at Eritrea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been steadily increasing since the end of the Tigray war, a devastating conflict in which the two neighbours fought as allies despite their fraught history.
Eritrea was not included in the peace deal that ended the conflict, and felt sidelined by what it perceived as an Ethiopian attempt to marginalise it. Since then, the two countries have moved to undermine each other by supporting opposition forces within each other’s borders. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s public statements asserting his landlocked country needs sea access and holds historic claims to Eritrea's port city of Assab further inflamed the situation.
Adding another layer of complexity to the tensions is the recent factionalisation of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which has seen two main competing blocs align themselves with Addis Ababa and Asmara, respectively. There have been persistent warnings in recent months that this internal power struggle could erupt into a conflict that draws in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Both countries have been equipping themselves with armed drones, air defences, missiles, armoured vehicles, and other military technology, while mobilising their forces along the border near Assab. With the relationship between Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki now believed to be “beyond repair”, there are serious concerns that this volatile situation could lead to an imminent war.
Despite these anxieties - which are far from unfounded - doubt has been cast over the likelihood of this worst-case scenario materialising. Addis Standard argues that the Ethiopian military lacks the capacity to engage in a large-scale conflict, given its ongoing struggles fighting insurgencies in the Amhara and Oromo regions. The capabilities and desire for another likely devastating war amongst key stakeholders in both Tigray and Eritrea have also been questioned. Nonetheless, these precarious, intertwined conditions mean a miscalculation could quickly evolve into significant hostilities.
Niger Announces New Civilian Militia Force
On 5 August, it was reported that the M62 movement - an alliance of neo-sovereignist civil society groups formed in 2022 to oppose French military presence in Niger - had launched the ‘Garkouwar Kassa’(Shields of the Homeland in Hausa) initiative. As part of Garkouwar Kassa, civilian volunteers will be recruited, trained, and armed to combat both internal and external threats. According to Interior Minister General Mohamed Toumba, the "volunteers will participate in night patrols, patriotic education and counter-disinformation programs, as well as community service.”
While ostensibly formed by the M62 movement, the decision to form Garkouwar Kassa is highly likely to have been ordered from the upper echelons of Niger’s military government, which - despite its promises to reduce insecurity - has seen militant Islamist-linked fatalities continue to rise under its rule. Short of manpower to secure its vast territory, the junta has seemingly concluded that urgent new measures are needed.
Bearing unmistakable similarities to Burkina Faso’s Les Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP), a government-sponsored militia that typically trains, arms, and deploys its volunteers in the matter of weeks, Garkouwar Kassa fighters are likely to become a defining feature of Niger’s security landscape sooner rather than later. While the impact of the initiative may not be immediately evident, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which they fare better than their Burkinabe counterparts.
The VDP’s inception in 2020 has coincided with a dramatic uptick in violence and bloodshed in Burkina Faso. While at times the force acts as a deterrent, its frequent and often indiscriminate targeting of civilians, typically from pastoralist communities, has massively exacerbated insecurity. The VDP’s actions have pushed communities toward jihadists for protection, who in turn have targeted the force to legitimise their own actions, exact revenge, or portray themselves as a protector, triggering “self-perpetuating” violence.
Similar patterns of behaviour have been observed in Niger itself, where semi-autonomous militias - such as the Zankai and Garde Nomade - with varying levels of loyalty to the government have been accused of worsening cycles of communal violence through indiscriminate attacks against civilians. The Islamic State Sahel Province recently justified its attacks against these militias for this very reason.
For Niger’s junta, however, these risks may be worth the reward. Beyond bolstering its stretched security forces, a loyal militia network offers a less obvious benefit: extending the regime’s nationwide influence and securing its personal power through the mobilisation of patriotic and loyal fighters. Garkouwar Kassa’s dual purpose evidently makes it an appealing policy decision, but it is one that could inadvertently create unsustainable conditions over the long term.
Trump Gives Somaliland Hope of Recognition, Fighting Re-erupts in Jubaland
Since 1991, Somaliland has declared itself independent from Somalia but failed to gain any international recognition. Yet now, some 34 years later, its long-awaited hopes may soon be realised. In late March, Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi declared that "Recognition is on the horizon,” after holding talks with the Trump administration. Further hope came on 9 August, when President Trump stated that he is “looking into” how to handle Somaliland, prompting a jubilant reaction from its citizens.
Mineral access is again reportedly on offer for the US in return for its recognition of Somaliland, as too is the construction of a military base strategically positioned on the Red Sea, and perhpas even the acceptance of refugees from Gaza. Standing in Somaliland’s way, however, are the risks of alienating Somalia's federal government, antagonising the African Union, and destabilising the increasingly fraught Horn of Africa - concerns unlikely to be taken lightly by some US policymakers.
Nonetheless, the international system remains unpredictable, and President Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy has been described as “a driving force on the world stage”. Recognition of Somaliland would have significant implications for the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu, with other regions, as well as the omnipresent al-Shabaab, testing its authority over the country.
In Jubaland state, fighting between local security forces and federal troops erupted once on 11 August in the strategic region of Gedo, which borders Ethiopia and Kenya. Both sides traded blame for the violence, which resulted in numerous casualties. The clashes in recent weeks have resulted from gradually escalating tensions between Jubaland and Mogadishu, triggered by a range of factors including the federal government’s unwillingness to recognise Ahmed Madobe’s reelection as President of Jubaland, control over Gedo, and the recent deployment of a contentious commander by the federal government.
The recent developments detract from what has been a more successful week for Mogadishu in its fight against al-Shabaab. On 8 August, following a lengthy operation, federal troops and Ugandan soldiers recaptured the town of Bariire, lost earlier this year. According to Somalia’s Defence Minister it was “more than just a tactical victory… a severe blow to al-Shabaab and a huge victory for our forces.”
President Ouattara’s Attempts to Stay in Power Trigger Protests
Last month, Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara announced he will run for a fourth term in October’s elections - a move that would have been impossible had he not removed term limits in 2016. The 83-year-old leader justified his decision by arguing that Côte d'Ivoire’s significant security and fiscal challenges require management by an experienced figure, strongly hinting at the election’s likely outcome. Indeed, Ouattara seems to believe it is only his experience that can tackle these issues, as former President Laurent Gbagbo, former Credit Suisse chief executive Tidjane Thiam, and two others were banned from standing earlier this year.
Over the weekend, thousands took to the streets across the country to protest against President Ouattara’s candidacy and the banning of Gbagbo and Thiam. However, Ouattara has weathered far more severe storms, some of which have erupted following his re-election in previous votes, and is unlikely to relent unless pressure escalates remarkably in the coming months.
Côte d'Ivoire remains a relatively stable nation in a region increasingly characterised by instability; it is also a reliable partner to the West and the region’s economic powerhouse. These factors have shielded Ouattara from serious international scrutiny despite his authoritarian tendencies. However, by doing so, Ouattara has diminished the Ivorian people’s freedoms, laid bare the double standards of global and regional partners, and contributed to West Africa’s recent democratic backsliding.
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