The Sub-Saharan Security Review
24 June - 1 July (Features New Quick-Read Summary Section)
Weekly Summary:
An IS-SP leader was killed and another surrendered in Mali. JNIM conducted coordinated attacks against seven urban areas in the country’s west and centre, reportedly losing 80 fighters.
A peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was announced in Washington. The mechanics of the agreement remain unclear and leave room for further friction. The Congolese Government and the M23 rebel group are in talks over a deal, which will likely be far more influential for long-term peace in the region.
Anti-government protests took place over several days in Togo. They erupted following President Gnassingbe's moves to extend his rule indefinitely, violent police tactics, a rise in electricity prices, and other grievances.
Exactly one year after anti-government protesters stormed the Kenyan parliament, large-scale unrest engulfed much of the country once again. Despite the government’s attempts to conceal it, public dissatisfaction remains high.
Bandits staged deadly attacks in Nigeria, killing 17 soldiers. Military efforts to eliminate a notorious leader continue, though more measures are needed to tackle the broader crisis. ISWAP attacked another military camp in the northeast.
IS-SP Loses Two Leaders as JNIM Launches Coordinated Attacks
On 28 June, an Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-SP) foreign fighter, named as Abou Dahdah, was killed in a military operation in the town of Chimam, Menaka region. Supported by Russian Africa Corps personnel and local militiamen, Malian troops killed Dahdah, along with his bodyguard and several other militants, as he was preparing to preach to local residents. Reportedly an explosives expert involved in coordinating offensive operations, including the recent large-scale attack in Bani Bangou, Dahdah’s death was a major coup.
Only a day later, an IS-SP leader named Boubacar Ibrahim, more commonly known as Oubel, and ten of his men surrendered to authorities in the nearby Ansongo cercle. Since late 2023, there had been rumours of internal friction between Oubel and other IS-SP factions. In a televised interview, Oubel claimed that his life was under threat from the extremist group, as they had determined that he had stopped following their direction and religious dogma.
As with many militants in the Sahel, Oubel’s role as an armed actor predates his membership with IS-SP. His defection and variety of allegiances highlights the reality for many fighting on the ground, who, when confronted with political or social challenges, exercise agency and adapt to shifting circumstances.
Two days after Oubel’s surrender, the region’s most dominant armed group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), launched a major offensive operation in the country’s west and centre. In the early hours of 1 July, JNIM militants attacked seven urban areas: Niono, Diboli, Sandare, Gogui, Kayes, Nioro du Sahel, and Molodo.
The most significant assaults came in Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, where police stations, military bases, and even the residence of a governor were struck. Despite suffering material losses, the FAMa were able to claim victory, stating that over 80 militants had been killed by soldiers repelling the onslaught.
The armed forces were able to limit the damage inflicted by JNIM, demonstrating that the group has yet to achieve the capacity to capture and hold major urban areas. However, JNIM’s offensive operation still highlighted some of the conflict’s evolving dynamics.
In recent years the extremist group has been expanding westward through the country toward areas vital to the national economy. Coordinating simultaneous attacks on seven locations outside of its heartlands - some of which were almost 700 km apart - the operation underscored JNIM’s growing capabilities and reach.
The targeting of a police station and customs office in Diboli, found less than a kilometre from Senegal, was perhaps the most concerning dimension of the attack - particularly following recent reports that the group is seeking to expand into the country. As JNIM continues to encroach deeper into Malian territory toward the borders with Senegal and Guinea, the two neighbouring states will need to implement sufficient measures to counter the group’s pernicious influence.
DRC and Rwanda Announce Peace Deal
On 27 June, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace treaty, mediated by the US and Qatar, in Washington to end their long-standing conflict. Before anointing the deal with his signature at the Oval Office, President Donald Trump heralded the agreement as “a tremendous breakthrough” and “a new chapter of hope and opportunity” for the region.
Given the mineral access his country has obtained by brokering the agreement, Trump’s jubilation was far from surprising. However, the DRC’s Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner was more cautious in her words, warning that “Those who have suffered the most are watching. They are expecting this agreement to be respected, and we cannot fail them.” Time will now tell whether this deal will bring peace to the region, but its ambiguity leaves little reason for optimism.
The DRC’s pledge to dismantle the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu extremist group with strong links to the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, is a core tenet of the deal. The Hutu group has operated in the eastern DRC for decades, at times cooperating with the Congolese government. Aside from economic and political goals, the Rwandan government’s support for the M23 rebel group has been motivated by the perceived threat posed by the FDLR.
Rwanda has agreed to withdraw its troops from Congolese territory once the FDLR has been nullified. The subjectivity of this aspect leaves room for Rwandan President Paul Kagame to keep his troops in the DRC for an extended period, should he wish - a scenario that is far from implausible. Nevertheless, a prolonged decline in hostilities will likely hinge more on a deal between the Congolese government and M23, which has yet to be agreed, than the outcome of the FDLR’s dismantling.
Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi is reportedly hoping a deal can be struck with the rebel group - which still holds swathes of Congolese territory - before a summit with Trump and Kagame in July. Reports claim the Congolese government is not necessitating the rebels withdraw by this presidential meeting, but expects them to agree to do so over the coming months.
These ongoing diplomatic movements may well reduce hostilities between the DRC, Rwanda, and M23. However, with scores of armed groups active in the eastern DRC, these deals address only a fragment of the region’s complex threat matrix. Until a broader range initiatives and policies are introduced to reduce the number of violent actors, bloodshed and conflict are likely to persist.
Discontent in Togo as Gnassingbe Takes on New Title
Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Togo has been ruled by the Gnassingbe dynasty for all but seven years. Since his father’s death in 2005, Faure Gnassingbe has maintained a firm grip over the country. The Togolese leader has been accused of rigging elections and has made constitutional changes to facilitate his indefinite rule, moves that have provoked public outrage on numerous occasions over the past two decades.
In May last year, Togo moved from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This reform made Gnassingbe's former role of President of the Republic a ceremonial post, with the leader assuming the new position of President of the Council of Ministers. Last month, Gnassingbe officially assumed this new title, which conveniently allows him to remain in power without any term limits.
The completion of this change, which opposition members have labelled “a constitutional coup”, led to protests and rallies in early June. The government reacted stiffly, arresting dozens of critics, using tear gas to disperse demonstrations, and restricting international reporting. While many of those arrested were later released, Amnesty International accused security forces of using violence and torture against some of the detainees.
Opposition to the constitutional change and the government’s harsh crackdown, combined with anger over a rise in energy prices, led to significant protests on 26, 27, and 28 June. These protests witnessed heavy clashes between activists and security personnel, and left at least seven people dead. The unrest subsided by 29 June, with an uneasy calm descending over the country.
Nonetheless, anger over Gnassingbe’s autocratic rule undoubtedly remains, with a coalition of opposition parties now demanding an inquiry into police violence. However, the Gnassingbe dynasty has long depended on the support of the Togolese security apparatus, meaning a comprehensive investigation is unlikely.
The leader has weathered many storms throughout his lengthy tenure. But in a region marred by regime changes, he will be all too aware that power is fragile - even for the longest serving leaders. Coming at a time in which Gnassingbe is attempting to manage numerous economic, social, and security challenges, further unrest will apply increasing amounts of pressure on the longtime leader.
Kenya’s Enduring Anti-Government Sentiments
Tensions have mounted in Kenya over recent weeks, following the death of an online activist in police custody. The victim was arrested after accusing a high-ranking police official of corruption, with his death initially being covered up by authorities. Far from the first incident of police brutality, the incident sparked outrage and prompted thousands to take to the streets in protest. The shooting of a street vendor and violence by government-affiliated men, referred to locally as “goons”, during these protests added further fuel to the fire.
For President William Ruto, these inflammatory events were poorly timed, as the country was edged closer to the one-year anniversary of a landmark moment in its recent history. Last summer, anti-government protests prompted by a controversial tax bill engulfed the country, reaching their peak with the storming of the Kenyan parliament on 25 June.
Awaiting planned commemorative protests, Kenya’s government and security apparatus braced themselves by locking down the capital. Nevertheless, thousands demonstrated in Nairobi and 23 counties across the country to call for President Ruto’s resignation. Activists clashed violently with police throughout 25 June. The stringent security measures in place prevented a repeat of last year’s damaging events, yet activists remained able to showcase their fierce opposition to the government.
Heavy clashes between police and protesters once again characterised the unrest, with Amnesty Kenya reporting that at least 16 people were killed and 400 wounded - some by live ammunition. Police later announced that 485 people were arrested, 448 of whom have been charged, and thousands of businesses looted or burned.
Anticipating the scale of the violence that was likely to unfold that day, the government also attempted to enact an emergency measure to ban live coverage of the protests. Although this ban was refused by the courts, the attempt was symbolic of the Ruto government’s consistent efforts to cover up dissent and discontent with its leadership, which has struggled to deliver on its promises of social and economic change.
Bandits and ISWAP Attack the Military
On 24 June, just hours after the killing of 44 government-affiliated militiamen by bandits loyal to the notorious warlord Bello Turji in Zamfara, 17 soldiers were killed and four wounded in the neighbouring states of Niger and Kaduna. According to the military, bandits conducted simultaneous attacks on three forward operating bases and clashed with soldiers for hours. The armed forces quickly responded, using ground forces and air assets to kill scores of the attackers.
Nigeria’s banditry crisis - which has come to impact millions in the northwest and parts of the north centre - has yet to improve despite the armed forces’ sustained efforts. The military's inability to capture or kill Bello Turji, now among Nigeria’s most infamous violent actors, after over six months of operations is indicative of the challenges faced in chasing these often amorphous and transient groups of armed men.
However, the government placed further pressure on Turji on 29 June, when vigilante forces reportedly killed scores of his bandits in Zamfara, including one of his closest associates. Turji is one of many bandit leaders operating in Nigeria, meaning that while his elimination could provide some communities with respite, many others will still live in daily fear until a more wholesale strategy to reduce banditry is found.
On the northeastern front, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) continued its ‘Holocaust of the Camps’ campaign via an assault on a base in Goniri, Yobe state. The attack, which killed six soldiers, marked the fourteenth time the group has successfully dislodged the military from one of its bases in the northeast since its major offensive began four months ago. Despite this latest operation, ISWAP’s campaign in Nigeria has slowed in recent weeks, with some of its focus seemingly shifting toward Cameroon, as demonstrated by the killing of ten IS militants near the Nigeria-Cameroon border on 30 June.
Great review. It highlights just how fragmented the security landscape has become across the region.
Awesome read! Do you think that the US which is reportedly sending a delegation to Mali will take a similarly transactional role in Mali and the Sahel?