The Sub-Saharan Security Review

11 August - 18 August

JNIM Escalates Conflict with ISSP

The prolonged conflict between JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has taken on an increasingly regional dimension in 2026, with the two groups clashing in Niger and Nigeria for the first time. While the frequency and severity of recent inter-militant clashes have failed to reach the levels seen several years ago, there have been signs of escalating tensions that could propel the conflict into a new phase.

Currently, Burkina Faso is not the primary offensive focus for either group; JNIM is concentrating on operations in Mali and ISSP in Niger. But Burkinabe territory in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area – spanning Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – remains the main theatre of conflict between them. The contest took a somewhat unexpected turn in early February, after a high-ranking JNIM commander named Sadou defected to ISSP.

Following his move, Sadou levelled a series of accusations against JNIM, claiming the group had entered non-aggression pacts with the governments of Benin and Cote d’Ivoire, that it failed to impose Sharia law in territory under its control, and that rank-and-file fighters sacrificed their lives while mid-ranking leaders remained safely behind the frontlines.

Image 1: Sadou, the Former JNIM Commander Who Defected to ISSP.

JNIM fighters, who had infiltrated ISSP’s ranks by posing as new recruits, assassinated Sadou near the Burkinabe-Nigerien border in mid-July. While this operation initially appeared to be an act of revenge, a JNIM attack on 17 August, during which the group reportedly killed ISSP’s emir of north-eastern Burkina Faso and several others in ambush, suggests that the group may be adopting a more proactive stance towards combating its adversary.

If confirmed, this operation would stand as one of the most significant recent developments in the long-running conflict between the two groups – one that could serve as the catalyst for further escalation. Pro-JNIM channels have since warned that ISSP may be preparing for a large-scale offensive across parts of Burkina Faso in response, indicating this recent saga may only be in its infancy.

Anti-Government Rebels Resurface in Niger

Anti-government rebel groups, not to be confused with the jihadist organisations currently operating in and around its borders, have been a recurring feature throughout much of Niger’s history as an independent nation.

These groups, predominantly hailing from Tuareg and Toubou communities, have oscillated between conflict and cohabitation with the central authorities in Niamey, with a peace deal in 2009 bringing an end to the last major uprising. The relationship shifted once again in July 2023, after the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tiani deposed Mohamed Bazoum in a coup d’etat.

The putsch birthed a new wave of armed opposition, operating under often confusingly similar monikers such as Council of Resistance for the Republic (CRR), the Free Armed Forces (FAL), the Patriotic Front for Justice (FPJ), the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL), and the Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice (MPLJ). The threat posed by these groups since the summer of 2023 should not be overstated.

While these groups have remained a thorn in the military government’s side, their inability to unify, limited resources and manpower, restricted geographic reach, and desire to profit from Niger’s lucrative transnational smuggling trade have relegated them to a secondary concern.

Over the past 12 months, almost of all of Niger’s sporadic rebel attacks have been carried out by the MPLJ, which has demonstrated a particular preference for the Agadem oil block, a Chinese-operated field that constitutes a key source of foreign revenue for the government. Following an attack on this target in February, the MPLJ lay largely dormant until last week.

On 15 August, the group attacked security positions in Seguedine, located in the country’s northeast. The rebels killed several security personnel and kidnapped three others, with the MPLJ’s leader Moussa Kounai later threatening that “these actions will continue”.

Image 2: MPLJ Rebels During the Recent Attack.

Ongoing military pressure on the MPLJ and other groups active in Niger’s eastern and northern territory rasies questions over their ability to stage attacks at a greater tempo. Nevertheless, the release of the FPL’s leader, Mahmoud Salah, from captivity in Libya last month led to a series of renewed threats and the announcement of several new coalitions. Moreover, locked in a dispute with the Nigerien government, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) reportedly provided Salah with weapons and equipment after releasing him, indicating tthat a new phase of rebel activity may be on the horizon.

Zambian Elections Marred by Controversy

Zambia’s incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema took power in 2021, shortly after his country defaulted on its sovereign debt during the Covid-19 pandemic - the first African nation to do so during this period. Zambia’s economic recovery, spurred by record copper prices, served as the cornerstone for Hichilema’s popularity. Despite the country’s rebound under his stewardship, the high cost of living remained a key issue for segments of the population, as did some of the government’s behaviours, perceived by some as undemocratic.

Among a select number of countries in the region that have experienced a peaceful transfer of power among several different political parties, Zambia has historically enjoyed a reputation as one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s democratic success stories. However, as the August 2026 elections drew closer, some of the legislative and constitutional decisions of President Hichilema’s government prompted further concern – particularly from opposition figures.

The vote on 13 August pitted an alliance of parties led by President Hichilema’s United Party for National Development against its main opponent, the Tonse-Pamodzi alliance, headed by presidential hopeful Brian Mundubile. Five days later, on 18 August, it was officially declared that President Hichilema had been re-elected, obtaining approximately 60% of the vote.

Image 3: President Hichilema Celebrates His Victory.

The elections, however, had been far from a smooth process. Voting took place by and large without any major issues, though there was significant turbulence in the days following. Less than 24 hours after the ballots had closed, authorities announced that counting had been paused due to violence and theft at polling stations. Leading opposition figure Mundubile quickly sounded the alarm over the potential for interference, as well as claims that the military had become involved at counting centres.

Counting later resumed, and the government later reported that 11 people, including prominent political figures, had been arrested in connection with a conspiracy to disrupt the elections - one also involving foreign nationals and clandestine military training camps. Mundubile claimed that his residence was raided, with local media reporting that the opposition figure and his running mate had sought refuge at a UN agency in Lusaka. The events have prompted significant debate over the legitimacy of the vote and the government’s actions, yet the markets are expected to react favourably to the victory of Zambia’s “pro-business” president.

RSF Responds to Recent Defeats in Sudan

After a period of heavy losses, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has made marked efforts to regain the initiative in its enduring conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Last week, the RSF and its allies launched a large-scale offensive on the town of Geisan in Blue Nile State. After seizing the strategic urban centre, the paramilitary group then led an offensive on the nearby town of Kurmuk, which had been retaken by the SAF only weeks earlier. The fall of Kurmuk on 13 August reversed most of the SAF’s recent gains along the Ethiopian border.

Against this backdrop, the RSF also launched a series of drone attacks against SAF-held areas across the country, notably including the capital, Khartoum, and nearby areas in the greater capital region - Omdurman and Bahri. The city of El-Obeid in North Kordofan State was also among the targets, with drone attacks soon followed by ground assaults southwest of the city on 14 August.

While Khartoum and its environs have faced far fewer RSF assaults in recent months, El-Obeid has been at the centre of the paramilitary group’s crosshairs. Pressure has eased somewhat following recent successful SAF operations, but the city remains under constant attack and dire humanitarian conditions persist.

Image 4: RSF Fighters.

The offensive operations have been described as an attempt to raise faltering morale among RSF fighters and allied forces, yet it remains to be seen if they will lead to any sustained momentum. Recent reports have cast doubt on the durability of the ongoing push in Blue Nile State, as the attention of the SPLM-N, an allied group that has been heavily involved in fighting there, may soon be diverted back towards protecting its stronghold in South Kordofan State, where violence has erupted between its fighters and tribal forces. The RSF also suffered another blow when its governor of Kordofan region announced his defection to the SAF in a public interview.

A Week of Releases in the Central Sahel

The central Sahel saw a range of figures released from captivity over the past week. On 13 August, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) freed 82 Malian soldiers captured during combat from 2023 to 2026 on “humanitarian grounds”. It remains unclear what the FLA obtained in return; however, reports suggest that Togo played a key role in brokering the deal. There have been widespread reports that a prominent FLA leader, detained 16 months ago in Niger, was freed in exchange, though there has been no confirmation at the time of writing.

Around the same time, the Malian government reported that it had pardoned a French intelligence agent, Yann Vézilier, who was detained last summer for his alleged involvement in a failed coup attempt. He was released only months after he had been sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Moroccan government reportedly played a key role in negotiating Vézilier’s release on behalf of Paris. The price paid for his freedom remains shrouded in secrecy, though Bamako received unspecified concessions.

Then, in the early hours of 14 August, reports emerged stating that Kevin Rideout, a US missionary pilot kidnapped from his home in Niamey in October, had been released by Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Rideout was handed over to Libyan authorities under the control of Khalifa Haftar, who reportedly paid $12 million for his release. US President Donald Trump took to social media to welcome Rideout’s release, though he failed to mention the involvement of Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), said to have been a key player in the negotiation efforts.

Image 5: A IRCR Helicopeter in Kidal.

Throughout this period, JNIM also released approximately 60 civilians recently kidnapped in western Mali, with nothing to suggest an exchange occurred. To round off this flurry of liberations, the FLA released a further six Malian soldiers in poor health on 16 August, permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross to transport them from Kidal to Gao via helicopter.

While the links between some of these developments, particularly ISSP’s release of Kevin Rideout and Mali’s pardon of Yann Vézilier, are not inherently obvious, the timing suggests they unlikely occurred near-simultaneously by coincidence. The limited information available in many of these cases also complicates efforts to draw any definitive conclusions.

Nonetheless, the events highlight that talks between opposing actors in Mali’s conflict are discreetly taking place despite the conflict’s recent escalation. They also draw attention to the role that external actors - particularly those from North Africa such as Morocco, Algeria, and Libya’s LNA - are playing behind the scenes. Finally, the large ransom fee obtained by ISSP further confirms that the central Sahel’s kidnap-for-ransom economy is booming once again. The proceeds received by the group are likely to fuel its activities in the region, as well as those of provinces across the world.