The Sub-Saharan Security Review
15 July - 22 July
Weekly Summary
An Indian national was kidnapped from a commercial project in Niger by JNIM. The victim is the latest foreigner known to have been abducted in the central Sahel this year. JNIM and IS-SP are likely to take more foreign hostages over the coming months.
The Congolese government and the M23/AFC rebel coalition agreed the Declaration of Principles in Qatar on 19 July. The accord is expected to lead to a conclusive deal that will end their hostilities, yet questions as to whether this can be achieved remain.
11 people were killed at a Russian-controlled mine in the Central African Republic, a country the Kremlin holds significant influence over. Moscow is now pushing the government to accept a transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps, but President Touadéra remains hesitant.
Tensions between Puntland and the Somali Federal Government are heightened. Puntland authorities seized a maritime vessel carrying military equipment off its coastline, in what appears to be a retaliation for Mogadishu’s alleged interference in its internal affairs.
The Malian military faces difficult circumstances while trying to maintain its control over the country’s north. Recent weeks have seen militants launch numerous attacks on supply convoys.
Foreign National Kidnappings Continue in the Sahel
In the years leading up to 2025, the central Sahel witnessed a average of two to four foreign national kidnappings annually. However, since January, armed actors in the region have abducted at least 19 foreign nationals in Mali and Niger across eight separate incidents, with an additional kidnapping taking place in southern Algeria. The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-SP) has been linked to the first five of these cases, but is not thought to have carried out an abduction of a foreigner since May.
Its extremist rival, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), once notorious for kidnapping foreigners, was not linked to an abduction until early May, when two Chinese nationals were taken from a small mining site in Mali’s Koulikoro region. Since then, the group is believed to have kidnapped an Iranian national in the same area, as well as three Indian nationals and a Chinese national from a cement factory in the Kayes region earlier this month.
JNIM’s recent kidnappings have come as part of a broader campaign against economic interests in Mali, with the group also having attacked a host of commercial sites and assets in Kayes and Koulikoro over the past several months. However, on 15 July, JNIM attacked a Nigerien army unit guarding an electrical infrastructure project in the Dosso region. According to Indian media outlets, militants killed two Indian workers and took another hostage.
While there is a danger to overanalysing what may be a random deviation from the recent baseline, the latest incident in Niger potentially indicates that more of JNIM’s sub-groups are seeking to kidnap foreigners for ransom. Whether IS-SP will attempt to abduct more hostages in the near-term remains to be seen, though the lucrative rewards involved will no doubt be difficult to resist.
All but three of the hostages taken this year have hailed from India, China, Morocco, or Iran, in what is a clear reflection of the central Sahel’s new geopolitical landscape. While Morocco was quick to secure the release of its four nationals, the responses of the Indian, Chinese, and Iranian governments to this seemingly increased threat facing both their citizens and economic interests has yet to be revealed.
DRC and M23/AFC Rebels Agree Deal
At times, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) conflict with the Rwanda-backed M23/AFC rebel alliance has appeared an intractable crisis. Nonetheless, recent months have seen Qatar and the US spearhead a diplomatic push to bring about negotiated peace - between both the Congolese and Rwandan governments, and separately between the DRC and M23/AFC. These ongoing talks have often been as protracted as the conflict itself; however, international efforts have yielded tangible outcomes, even if they appear to rest on shaky foundations.
Weeks after the Congolese and Rwandan governments ratified a peace deal in Washington D.C., the DRC and the M23/AFC alliance signed the Declaration of Principles in Qatar on 19 July. As part of the agreement, which will come into force on 27 July, the two warring parties must cease offensive operations as well as refrain from "hate propaganda" and "any attempt to seize by force new positions on the ground". Although the accord marks significant progress, it is meant only to pave the way for a more conclusive agreement, due to be announced by 18 August.
In the aftermath of the deal's announcement, sources of contention presented themselves almost immediately. Under the Declaration of Principles, both sides seemingly agreed on the return of state institutions and security forces to territory currently occupied by the rebels. However, Congolese representatives claimed to have secured an M23/AFC withdrawal from the eastern DRC. This statement prompted the head of the coalition's delegation to state Kinshasa was acting in bad faith, and that the rebels “will not retreat, not even by one meter.”
There is scepticism over whether this major sticking point can be resolved within such a short timeframe, along with when or under what conditions an M23/AFC withdrawal would occur. Even if a compromise is reached, the strength of the potentially ‘definitive’ peace deal will rest as much on its fine print as it will on the long-term commitment of the stakeholders involved. Indeed, there are doubts over the commitment of the warring parties to sustainable peace, and ambiguity over how the agreement will be monitored, and what consequences will follow any violations, leaves little room for optimism.
Russia Pushes for Africa Corps Takeover in CAR
In 2018, roughly one thousand troops from the Russian Wagner Group were deployed to the Central African Republic (CAR). The personnel arrived at the request of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, as rebels were advancing on the capital, Bangui. Russian troops played a key role in turning the tide of the conflict. They have since helped reestablish government control over parts of the country and secured the Touadéra regime.
The Wagner Group obtained unrestricted logging rights and access to some of CAR’s diamond and gold deposits in return for its deployment, which it has often secured through indiscriminate violence against civilians. Since 2020, there has been a list of killings at Russian-control mining sites in the country, the most recent of which came on 15 July, when 11 people were reportedly shot dead at a gold mine in Ndassima.
The Touadéra regime has done little to curtail the frequent human rights abuses and extrajudicial violence carried out by Wagner security personnel - Russian infiltration is believed to run so deep that some observers have questioned whether attempting to do so is even an option. Providing personal protection for President Touadéra, training CAR forces, and fighting on the frontlines, the Wagner Group is an irreplaceable asset for the current government. However, having deeply penetrated the country’s social, cultural, informational, and economic spheres, Russian influence in CAR stretches far beyond its security landscape.
Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group, the Russian government has largely subsumed the organisation. In countries like Mali, the Wagner Group announced its exit in June and was officially replaced by the state-controlled Africa Corps. In CAR, however, an official handover remains uncompleted. According to the outlet Africa Intelligence, the Touadéra administration is hesitant about the combat effectiveness of the new military outfit, but holds little leverage in its negotiations with the Kremlin. A transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps appears all but inevitable, though it remains unclear how this will impact the situation on the ground.
Tensions Escalate between Mogadishu and Puntland
The complexity of Somali politics cannot be overstated. Although internationally recognised as a singular entity, the country comprises of seven federal member states - among them is a de-facto nation, Somaliland, and the largely autonomous state of Puntland. Recent times have seen relations between Puntland and Mogadishu deteriorate; last year Puntland officially withdrew its recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia due to changes to the national constitution.
Tensions between Puntland and Mogadishu have escalated significantly over the past month. The autonomous state has accused the central government of mobilising clan militias in the disputed region of Sanaag, where they have clashed with Puntland security personnel around the town of Dhahar.
Several clans in Sanaag - a strategically vital region partially controlled by Puntland - and in the neighbouring Sool region are currently in negotiations to form a new federal state. The national constitution requires a member state be formed by at least two regions, yet it remains to be seen if these talks, which have angered both Puntland and Somaliland, will yield a tangible outcome.
Puntland has claimed that Mogadishu is orchestrating the move to divide and weaken it. A range of motivations - some longstanding, others more recent - have been offered to explain Mogadishu’s alleged interference in what Puntland sees as its internal affairs. However, it has been suggested that the Somali Federal Government is seeking to divert attention away from its struggles to contain al-Shabaab’s ongoing offensive, which stands in contrast to Puntland’s more successful battle against the Islamic State.
Amid this ongoing dispute, Puntland seized a cargo ship transporting Turkish weapons and military equipment to Mogadishu off its coastline on 18 July. The ownership and intended recipient of the cargo remain unclear. According to Puntland, the vessel entered its waters and remained near an area where the Islamic State is active without informing local authorities, thus breaching international maritime law. However, it is difficult to view the development as separate from the semi-autonomous region’s ongoing dispute with Mogadishu.
The Somali Federal Government has remained quiet on the seizure, at least publicly. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to view Puntland’s actions as anything less than inflammatory, meaning further escalation may be on the horizon.
The Battle for Control in Northern Mali Continues
Reclaiming strategic towns in northern Mali - including Anefis, Tessalit, Aguelhok, and Kidal - from Tuareg rebels, 2023 was a significant year for the military junta. It sought to further its control over the country’s north by attempting to capture the border town of Tinzaouaten last July. The outcome of this poorly executed operation made international headlines, with close to 100 Russian forces being killed in ambush by Tuareg and JNIM militants.
Although not reaching the same levels of bloodshed and devastation as the clashes in Tinzaouaten, the enduring contest for control of northern Mali has continued in the 12 months since. While the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners, now operating under the Africa Corps, maintain control over the region’s urban centres, the vast swathes of surrounding desert lie beyond their control.
Recent weeks have seen both Tuareg rebels, fighting under the banner of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and JNIM take advantage of these circumstances to launch attacks against the FAMa and Africa Corps. On 10 July, a military convoy consisting of scores of vehicles departed Gao on a resupply mission. Facing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, kamikaze drones, and the constant threat of ambush, the convoy has battled its way northward under constant pressure.
The most significant clash came in Alkit, some 25 km from Kidal, on 14 July. The battle saw militants destroy several vehicles and kill numerous soldiers, potentially including two Russian fighters. A helicopter was dispatched to repel the attackers, but reportedly crash-landed before making it back to its destination after coming under heavy fire. Over the past week there have been sporadic attacks, though the heavily-protected convoy has remained largely unscathed.
The increased pressure on supply routes in northern Mali has been facilitated, in part, by the FAMa’s loss of its final operational Bayraktar Akıncı drone. In early April, the aircraft was downed after allegedly straying into Algerian airspace - claims denied by the Malian government. With significant reach and endurance, this aircraft provided the military with an ability to monitor and strike militants it has been unable to fully replace.
The recent surge in kinetic activity in northern Mali highlights its significance to the long-term ambitions of the Malian government, the FLA, and JNIM. While currently an unlikely scenario, a significant shift in the current dynamics would reverberate across the wider region.
The DRC situation remains highly fragile indeed. The UN recently reported that its fact-finding mission was denied access to Eastern DRC by M23, which the UN says, undermines efforts to investigate human rights violations in the region.