The Sub-Saharan Security Review
29 April - 6 May
ISWAP Exploits Security Gaps in Nigeria
Northeast Nigeria is grappling with a wave of extremist violence, with the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) currently conducting a major offensive campaign across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The Nigerian security apparatus has borne the brunt of these attacks; its inability to counter ISWAP’s growing momentum has sent shockwaves through the country.
Although the scale and intensity of ISWAP’s recent violence have been notable; however, it is perhaps its ability to repeatedly attack military bases and camps using the same tactics that is most alarming. In recent months, ISWAP has frequently conducted nighttime raids on security installations, often leading soldiers to flee or tactically withdraw from their positions. Militants are then able to seize weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and other supplies before setting fire to whatever remains. With each attack, the military’s capabilities and morale are gradually eroded, while ISWAP grows stronger.
This exact blueprint was followed once again over the weekend, this time via an attack on a base in Buni Gari, Yobe State. Although no more than four security personnel were reportedly killed during the hours-long clash, ISWAP fighters were able to overwhelm the soldiers stationed at the base and force them to retreat. The attackers then rampaged through the base, destroying ten vehicles and the barracks and capturing a significant amount of weapons and equipment.
ISWAP’s ongoing campaign has exposed significant security gaps in northeastern Nigeria and the surrounding region, with neighbouring Niger and Cameroon also impacted. Militants have leveraged poor intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to launch surprise attacks, while the Nigerian Air Force’s failure to respond quickly has also become increasingly apparent.
While an insufficient capacity to anticipate and respond to attacks has undoubtedly contributed to ISWAP’s recent success, it is perhaps longer-term structural issues that have created conducive conditions for the group to exploit. State forces focus only limited resources on protecting areas outside of their bases and urban centres, providing extremists freedom to operate. In these ungoverned spaces, militants are able to exert influence over local populations and extract vital resources to further fuel their violent activities. Until ISWAP is pushed out from its strongholds, the group is likely to continue steadily escalating its violence.
Captain Traoré’s Popularity Showcased as Internal Tensions Rise
On 30 April, thousands of people took to the streets in Ouagadougou to show their support for Burkina Faso’s leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Solidarity demonstrations were also held in faraway locations such as London, Paris, and Kingston, as well as a host of cities in Africa.
The demonstrations were organised following a recently foiled coup attempt against the young leader, which was made public by his government last week. Contentious remarks made earlier this month by General Michael Langley - the head of the United States Africa Command - accusing Traoré of exploiting his country’s gold reserves at the expense of his people, were also a galvanising factor.
Since seizing power via a putsch in September 2022, Burkina Faso’s young leader has gained widespread popularity, both at home and abroad, by carefully crafting his image and language to mirror that of his country’s former revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara. Both seizing power after leading coups as young military officers, the genesis of both men’s rule is only the beginning of the long list of parallels between their reigns.
Like Sankara, Traoré’s staunch criticism of Western imperialism and strong Pan-Africanist stance has seen him garner significant support. He has also emulated Sankara by focussing on eradicating corruption and becoming economically self-reliant, enacting measures such as the nationalisation of two gold mines, launching Burkina Faso’s first-ever state-owned bank and gold refinery, as well as a major push to bolster the country’s agriculture industry, among a list of other policies and projects.
Sankara was assassinated in October 1987, less than four years after he took power - his short but impactful revolution saw him make many enemies. While Traoré’s policies have been well received by some, his zero tolerance for opposition or dissent, coupled with Burkina Faso’s rising levels of violence and insecurity, have led to numerous attempts to depose him from power.
What the future holds for Traoré remains to be seen. Yet there should be little doubt that he will continue to be revered by millions thanks to his image, which is widely believed to be shaped, at least in part, by the influence operations of his Russian partners. However, the young leader’s fate will likely rest on his ability to keep the armed forces on his side. The military’s loyalty is being increasingly tested by the mounting number of high-casualty terrorist attacks taking place nationwide, suggesting Troaré may ultimately meet a similar fate to his idol.
RSF Drone Attacks Begin New Chapter in Sudan’s Conflict
The recapture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in late March was heralded as a turning point in its battle for supremacy over the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) group. However, a recent wave of drone attacks launched by the RSF may altered the trajectory of Sudan’s conflict once again.
In recent weeks, the RSF has stepped up its aerial strikes using one-way attack (OWA) drones across the country, primarily against targets in Khartoum, North Darfur, and River Nile State - some of the epicentres of fighting in this years-long conflict.
However, on 4 May, the RSF broadened the scope of its aerial attacks by launching seven OWA drones against Port Sudan - marking the first time the city has been impacted by the war. Since it began, Port Sudan has been the SAF’s de facto seat of power and a haven for hundreds of thousands displaced by the heavy violence.
The first strikes - which were launched shortly after the SAF bombed the RSF-held Nyala airport - targeted Osman Digna Air Base, reportedly damaging an ammunition storage facility close to Port Sudan’s civilian airport. Sudan War Monitor noted that the arrival of a Turkish medevac jet shortly after the strike - despite reports of no major casualties - suggests that senior members of the SAF may have been injured and quietly evacuated to avoid a drop in morale.
In the days since, the RSF has launched further drone attacks on the northeastern city, with devastating effect. On 5 May, the group struck a fuel depot just south of the city, before attacking Port Sudan’s international airport, another fuel storage facility, a large power station, among other targets, on 6 May. The latest round of strikes plunged the city into total darkness and caused significant operational disruption at Sudan’s last functioning civilian airport and its largest port.
Having seen the momentum gradually shift away from its reach since the beginning of the year, the RSF has seemingly found new means to rebalance the battlefield equilibrium. Given Port Sudan’s strategic, economic, and political value to the SAF, persistent drone strikes carry a potential to hamper its war effort. However, these new long-range capabilities will not be a decisive edge for the RSF; instead, they will likely only prolong the conflict.
IS-M Launches Major Attack From New Sanctuary
The Islamic State’s Mozambique branch (IS-M) holds significantly less operational capacity compared to its peak strength several years ago, when its violence impacted swathes of the country’s northeast.
Following this spike in violence, Rwanda deployed troops to the region in 2021 at the request of the Mozambican government, their arrival coincided with a decrease in IS-M activity over the following two years. Despite these bolstered efforts to combat the group, attacks increased once more in 2024. However, the group’s activity this year has been hampered by a prolonged counteroffensive against IS’ Somalia branch, an important node in facilitating “the movements of trainers, tactical strategists, and financial support” to IS-M.
Despite challenges, IS-M has recently demonstrated that it nonetheless remains a potent threat. On 19 April, around 40 militants took control of the Kambako hunting ground in the Niassa Special Reserve, located on the border of the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, killing two security guards and six soldiers.
The camp was almost entirely destroyed during the attack, along with a plane and several vehicles. The site’s operator reported that IS-M had struck just as it had resupplied for the coming hunting season, allowing militants to seize an array of much-needed supplies including fuel, vehicles, food, water, solar systems, and radios.
In a potential indication that IS-M may soon embark on a fresh campaign of violence, the group has stated in subsequent media publications that the attack “represented a strong return to the Mujahadeen’s operations”. It also claimed the assault dealt a major blow to Mozambique’s tourist industry and proudly boasted that the United States government had updated its travel advisory in the wake of the attack.
Ten days after the initial assualt, militants struck the reserve again - killing two anti-poaching scouts, wounding another, and leaving two missing. Local media reports have since claimed that around 100 IS-M fighters have found a sanctuary in the Niassa Special Reserve - Mozambique’s largest protected area - leveraging its favourable physical terrain, limited state presence, and numerous strategically valuable targets - to rebuild their degraded offensive capabilities.
Fresh Airstrikes Compound Humanitarian Crisis in South Sudan
On 3 May, the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) launched a devastating aerial attack on Old Fangak, Jonglei State, a Nuer-majority area that was recently designated as hostile to the government of President Salva Kiir, a Dinka. Striking the only healthcare facility providing medical access to over 100,000 people, run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the assault reportedly killed seven civilians and injured 25 others. The NGO has described the attack as a "clear violation of international humanitarian law,” while the United Nations and the African Union also strongly condemned the strikes.
Last month, The New York Times reported that eight people died after being unable to access treatment in Jonglei State, where Save the Children was recently forced to close seven medical facilities and reduce operations at 20 others due to cuts in foreign aid. The latest attack will further exacerbate the dire humanitarian conditions facing those in the region, many of whom are also forced to contend with growing levels of food insecurity and violence.
The aerial strikes were ostensibly launched in retribution for the hijacking of several boats and barges in Fangak and Leer counties in Jonglei and Unity states, respectively, on 2 May. The SSPDF blamed the attacks on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the White Army militia, forces loyal to the detained First Vice President Riek Machar. These allegations have been refuted by the SPLM-IO.
These latest developments once again underscore that it is South Sudan’s civilian population who are suffering the most from the enduring power struggle between President Kiir and Vice President Machar. In recent days, members of the international community have made fresh calls for the South Sudanese leader to release his deputy from house arrest to prevent the country’s 2018 peace agreement from collapsing.
Nonetheless, President Kiir appears intent on recognising the controversial interim SPLM-IO leadership, which was created following Machar’s arrest and has been boycotted by many members loyal to the Vice President, to advance the peace deal. A veteran politician has argued that such a move would nullify the agreement, stating that “You cannot remove Riek whose name is written in the agreement as the first vice president and expect that the agreement will still be there.”