The Sub-Saharan Security Review
25 February - 4 March
JNIM Signals Long-Term Ambitions in Mali
As violence in the Central Sahel continues to rage at unprecedented levels, a sense of inevitability hangs over what lies ahead.
Militant groups continue to demonstrate their growing strength and territorial reach via a combination of lethal attacks and strategic moves designed to ensure their place in the long-term political future of the region.
The mounting crisis in the Central Sahel was best exemplified by recent developments in Mali. On 27 February, a ministerial convoy carrying the Minister of Sanitation was ambushed near Kati, close to the capital Bamako, leaving two people dead and ten others wounded.
The attack came two weeks after a convoy carrying the Minister of Higher Education was ambushed near Niéna, Sikasso region, injurying four security personnel. Both attacks have been attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
Despite being similar in their nature, the two attacks were reportedly carried out opportunistically. However, they come as part of a broader campaign currently being carried out by the Al-Qaeda branch across the region.
Having seized swathes of territory across the Central Sahel, JNIM is placing pressure on governments via persistent attacks along major roadways, particularly those leading to capital cities and other major urban centres.
Just days after the latest ambush, JNIM released a large photoset showcasing a militant training camp in the Sikasso region. Such publications are by no means a rarity, but the camp’s location is designed to demonstrate JNIM’s increasingly diverse ethnic make-up and broad appeal.
Located in the very south of the country, Sikasso is well beyond the group’s strongholds in central and northern Mali. Unlike these regions, Sikasso is not home to ethnic groups Sahelian governments have typically considered as susceptible to the allures of jihadism.
In a further illustration of JNIM’s desire to become a major political force across the region, it was reported yesterday that the group has recently initiated talks with the separatist rebel group Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).
JNIM and the FLA have allegedly been negotiating cooperation that will allow both to achieve some of their most significant aims - “if the situation arises” (i.e. the capture of major cities or the fall of the Malian government).
Keen to avoid repeating the mistakes that followed a similar agreement in 2012, JNIM has reportedly emphasised to the FLA that full-fledged independence from Mali is currently off the table.
Indeed, the Al-Qaeda branch believes that regional and international stakeholders are more likely to accept the FLA administering territory in northern Mali under JNIM’s interpretation of Sharia law than they are a formal declaration of an Islamic caliphate.
The parallels between these plans and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) rise from a jihadist group to the governing authority of Idlib province - and then Syria - are undeniable. However, only time will tell if JNIM can reshape Mali and the broader region as HTS has done in the Middle East.
Guinea-Bissau's Political Crisis Deepens as President Visits Russia
An Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation left Guinea-Bissau just over two weeks after its deployment, after President Umaro Sissoco Embalo threatened to expel the mission.
President Embalo postponed Guinea Bissau’s general election last November, announcing that they would instead be held on 30 November this year.
The move, permitted by a Supreme Court ruling, has allowed Embalo to remain in office until his successor takes office later this year, despite seeming to violate the constitution.
The ECOWAS mission announced on 2 March that it had met the president, politicians, civil society groups, and other key stakeholders to try and resolve the electoral impasse.
The president of Guinea-Bissau has claimed that the mission was given a day to leave the country after deviating from the agreed framework by meeting with certain civil society and religious leaders.
Leading opposition figure Domingos Simoes Pereira and his party maintain that Embalo’s term has now expired, however, and that an interim leader must take charge of the country while general elections are organised and held by 1 June.
Strict security measures have been put in place over the past two days to prevent the opposition from holding protests and bringing the country to a standstill.
President Embalo was elected in late 2019, taking over from Guinea Bissau’s first leader to have served a term without being overthrown or assassinated.
Embalo has himself survived at least two alleged attempts to depose him from power. Recent days have seen the president not only roll back on this promise to step down after one term, but also claim that he will win the first round of the upcoming vote.
Perhaps not so coincidentally, ECOWAS was ordered to leave the West African state shortly after President Embalo had returned from a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
Deals to explore Guinea-Bissau’s mineral reserves were reportedly the main topic of the meeting. However, given the Kremlin’s desire to expand its security and economic presence in Africa, coupled with Embalo’s recent contentious actions, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Russian security assistance was not also discussed.
The summit between Putin and Embalo concluded with the pair pledging to meet again soon, suggesting neither expects Embalo’s presidency to come to an end in the near future.
Whether internal actors seek to change this remains to be seen, though it should not be ruled out given Guinea-Bissau’s turbulent political past.
Al-Shabaab Escalates Offensive in Somalia
A major offensive carried by Somali Federal Government forces and allied militias in 2022-2023 saw Mogadishu reclaim swathes of territory under Al-Shabaab control.
However, an ongoing Al-Shabaab counteroffensive, launched several weeks ago in southern Hiraan and northern Middle Shabelle, is now threatening to reverse many of Mogadishu’s hard fought gains.
Fighting over the past week has continued at a high intensity, occasionally infringing on areas close to Mogadishu. On 27 February, Al-Shabaab militants entered the urban centre of Balcad, some 30 km from the federal capital.
Images shared by the extremist group showed fighters walking the streets of the city, after government soldiers and local clan militiamen (Macawisley) had fled their posts. Al-Shabaab was forced to withdraw from Balcad within hours, after Burundian troops helped government forces reclaim the city.
Mogadishu will be unable to call on support from Burundi for much longer, however, as Burundian troops are set to withdraw from Somalia imminently due to a disagreement between the two governments over troop numbers in the latest African Union mission.
Launched on the same day as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali visited Mogadishu, the timing and location of the assault appears to have been a strategic choice.
The Ethiopian leader, visiting to improve his country’s strained relations with the Somali Federal Government, was also welcomed by a mortar attack on the capital’s airport compound shortly after he arrived. Likely reflecting the heightened levels of insecurity in Somalia, President Ali’s trip to the capital lasted just three hours.
The days following have seen Al-Shabaab continue to capture urban centres and launch attacks across Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. Reports suggest fighting has been particularly intense in and around Adan Yabaal, Biya Cadde, Jowand, Ceelbaraf, and El Ali Ahmed.
It remains to be seen if the Somali Federal Government can sufficiently respond to Al-Shabaab’s ongoing offensive. Recent reports of officers and of soldiers being arrested for fleeing the frontlines, coupled with a reliance on local militias - plagued by sporadic bouts of clan infighting - highlight the scale of the challenges ahead.
Militant Groups Increasingly Threaten Niger and Its Neighbours
Militants have enjoyed increasing amounts of freedom in Niger following the military coup in July 2023.
Northern Mali and the border areas with Algeria have long been known as a JNIM stronghold; however, the group now appears to be seeking to extend its support zones and logistics networks to threaten and recruit from communities in northern Niger.
The expulsion of the French and American militaries from Niger, the latter of whom was operating the Airbase 201 in the country’s north, from where drones once gathered vital intelligence on the Central Sahel’s militants, has allowed JNIM and IS to expand their footprints. As too has the junta’s decision to recall troops from Niger’s hinterlands to protect the capital.
On 28 February, JNIM militants conducted an ambush on members of the Special Intervention Battalion near Ekadé Malane, Agadez, killing at least 11 soldiers. Following an assault in October on a security outpost in Assamaka, the latest attack was the group’s second ever in Niger’s very north.
JNIM’s expansion into northern Niger is unlikely to be among the junta’s primary concerns, as the looming threat of a major terrorist attack casts a shadow over the capital Niamey.
Last year, JNIM conducted four attacks within five miles of the capital administrative limits, suggesting that Niamey may soon be the next capital in the region to be attacked.
As the junta’s seat of power comes under increasing threats from JNIM, the Islamic State has been applying economic pressure via a wave of devastating attacks on supply convoys entering Niger via northern Tillabéri.
Elsewhere, Lakuwara, a Nigeria-based group with ties to IS-SP, has launched a string of attacks in Niger over the past year, the most notable of which came against soldiers guarding the Niger-Benin pipeline in July.
There have been several other damaging attacks on the multi-billion-dollar pipeline this year, although the group has not been confirmed as the perpetrator.
With the junta having cut ties with longstanding military partners and significantly reduced cross-border security cooperation, the post-coup environment has not only allowed jihadist groups to intensify their activity in Niger, but also further their reach in countries like Nigeria, Benin, and Libya.
An End to the Conflict Remains Illusive in the DRC
Conflict has persisted in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), although the advances of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels have slowed in recent weeks.
The past few days have seen fierce fighting between government-affiliated militias (Wazalendo) and M23-aligned rebel groups in South Kivu, with the former launching a counteroffensive around the towns of Bibogobogo, Minembwe, and Mikenge.
These offensive efforts have yielded only limited returns, while M23 and its allied groups - fighting under the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) - have reportedly broken through Wazalendo lines and reached the Mwenga territory, leaving only two territories in the province untouched by the rebel offensive.
These movements on the battlefield came just days after deadly explosions at an AFC rally in Bukavu, which left 11 people dead and over 60 wounded.
The public event, the first of its kind since M23 and its allies seized the capital of South Kivu, saw high-ranking leaders from the movement attend and give speeches.
The perpetrators of the attack remain unclear, though M23 and AFC were quick to blame the Congolese government. Refuting these claims, President Felix Tshisekedi labelled the attack “a heinous terrorist act that was perpetrated by a foreign army illegally present on Congolese soil.”
Amid the backdrop of this violence, M23 and AFC claimed several days ago to have handed over a list of fighters belonging to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to the Rwandan government.
The presence of the FLDR - a militia founded by ethnic Hutus who took part in the 1994 genocide against Rwanda's Tutsis - is ostensibly one of the primary motivations for M23’s campaign in the eastern DRC.
The Congolese government has claimed that the alleged FDLR members were prisoners dressed in military fatigues and “part of the Rwandan strategy to justify the invasion of parts of the DRC's territory,"
The Congolese government remains unwavering in its belief that M23 is an illegitimate force, and it continues to refuse direct negotiations with the rebel alliance.
However, there is nothing to suggest government forces are able to bring an end to the conflict militarily, meaning for now M23 is likely to continue seizing parts of the country’s east and laying the foundations for long-term governance in the areas it has recently captured.