The Sub-Saharan Security Review
15 April - 22 April
Benin Struggles to Contain Mounting Extremist Violence
Violence has been gradually escalating in northern Benin since December 2021, when the country suffered its first-ever terrorist attack. In late January, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants, belonging to the Katiba Hanifa group, launched a devastating assault on the Point Triple base - situated at the intersection of the Beninois, Burkinabè, and Nigerien borders. Killing 28 soldiers, it was by the country’s deadliest attack to date.
On 17 April, Katiba Hanifa struck the base once again, as part of a coordinated assault that also targeted a military position near the Koudou Falls area. According to the government, eight soldiers were killed and 13 others wounded. However, two days after the twin attacks, JNIM announced that its fighters had killed 70 soldiers.
Although the extremist group is known to exaggerate its claims, seldom, if ever, does it do so on such a scale. Footage of the attack shows dozens of soldiers slain in their defensive positions, suggesting it is JNIM’s version of events that lie closer to the truth. Taken together with the attack in January, Benin may have lost up to 80 percent of all soldiers killed between December 2021 - December 2024 within just the first four and a half months of this year.
Neither the government nor Beninois media outlets have deviated from the suspiciously low death toll of the recent attacks, despite these alternate claims. Last September, the Beninois government reminded journalists that reporting anything on the country’s increasingly difficult fight against terrorist groups that strays from the official line would lead to immediate suspension. Amid these rapidly escalating threats, the Beninois government has seemingly opted to hide the true gravity of the crisis unfolding in its northern territory.
Alongside this significant death toll, JNIM proudly displayed the vast array of weaponry, ammunition, and military equipment it seized during the attacks. Most notably, militants captured several mortars, three drones, explosives, and scores of firearms. These weapons will allow Katiba Hanifa to continue its deadly wave of violence against security forces in this corner of the region and intensify its expansion into northern Benin.
Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State Continue Violence in Somalia
Amid mounting al-Shabaab battlefield gains, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) is coming under increasing pressure. On 16 April, the militant group reclaimed Adan Yabal in the Middle Shabelle region and Aboorey in the Hiraan region, forcing the Somali National Army (SNA) to embark on a humiliating retreat from the two strategic towns after weeks of fighting.
Al-Shabaab’s ongoing offensive is not only reclaiming swathes of territory in central Somalia - some of which it lost in a major US-backed operation in 2022 - it is also progressively threatening the capital, Mogadishu, and exposing systemic inadequacies within the SNA and the SFG.
As attempts to halt al-Shabaab’s advances continue to falter, reports have emerged that the SFG’s long-standing partner, Turkey, is considering deepening its security assistance through the deployment of combat troops to support the SNA. While such a decision would likely bolster efforts to reverse the recent gains made by al-Shabaab, it is unlikely to provide a permanent solution to this decades-long threat.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is also expected to initiate a major reshuffle of the country’s security leadership. On 21 April, it was reported that the SNA’s Chief of the Defence had tendered his resignation; the head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, along with several senior and mid-level military officers, are set to be replaced too.
In semi-autonomous Puntland, over 1,000 km from Mogadishu, local authorities stated last week that they were close to declaring victory over the Islamic State’s Somalia branch (IS-Somalia). These claims, coupled with a notable absence of reporting on IS-Somalia’s activity in recent weeks by the group’s official media outlet, suggested the militant group may have suffered devastating losses during Puntland’s months-long offensive.
But after a several-week hiatus, IS’ weekly al-Naba publication - which provides commentary on its activity across the world - devoted nearly four pages to detailing the Somalia branch’s operations. Exemplifying the high intensity of violence unfolding in Puntland’s mountains, IS claims that at least 318 security personnel have been killed or wounded over 55 attacks in recent weeks.
Since publicly resurfacing on 17 April, IS-Somalia has reportedly killed or wounded an additional 50 security forces in an improvised explosive attack (IED), a ten-hour battle, and a suicide attack on a major base - underscoring that the group is far from defeated.
Former President Returns to the DRC, Adding to the Government’s Challenges
Ongoing peace talks between the Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group in Qatar are said to have made progress over the past week, according to RFI. Nonetheless, fighting has continued in the conflict-ridden North and South Kivu provinces, reemphasising the challenges facing this peace process.
The reported return of Joseph Kabila, former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), who had been living in exile since being ousted in 2019, has added an additional layer of complexity to the crisis.
The former Congolese leader is said to have arrived in Goma on 18 April. Although ostensibly returning to help bring an end to the fighting in the eastern DRC, Kabila’s decision to arrive first in the largest city under M23 control has given further credence to allegations of his complicity in the rebel group’s ongoing offensive.
President Tshisekedi’s government responded to Kabila’s return by suspending his political party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), and initiating legal proceedings against both actors for “their direct participation in the aggression conducted by Rwanda through the terrorist group CRA/M23”.
The Congolese government’s quick and comprehensive response comes as little surprise, as it has been argued that Kabila’s homecoming could have a galvanising effect on the Rwanda-backed rebels. While it remains unclear whether the former leader is seeking to reclaim power over the DRC or simply reenter the country’s political scene, his significant influence and extensive political and military connections make him a direct threat to President Tshisekedi’s increasingly tenuous rule.
Erik Prince, a man with a similarly checkered and contentious history, has also been making moves to bolster his position in the DRC. The founder of the notorious private security outfit, Blackwater, has reportedly agreed a deal with the Congolese government to help it secure and better profit from its sizeable mineral reserves, particularly in the southern province of Katanga. This initiative to protect and tax natural resources under government control likely stems from uncertainty over the future of the mineral deposits currently under M23 control in the country’s east.
Violence Escalates in Nigeria
Violence has been rising at an alarming rate in Nigeria over the past several weeks. In the country’s Middle Belt, long-standing tensions over access to land between farmers and herders have re-erupted with a devastating effect.
On 17 April, coordinated attacks on two villages in the Ukum and Logo local government areas, Benue State left at least 52 people dead. The identity of the perpetrators remains unknown, though Governor Hyacinth Alia blamed the attacks on herdsmen. Just days later, gunmen struck the area again, killing 11 others.
The incidents follow massacres earlier this month in neighbouring Plateau State, where over 60 people were killed. Local authorities also blamed predominantly Muslim herdsmen for the attacks, with Governor Caleb Manasseh Mutfwang accusing them of conducting a “genocide” against Christian farmers.
This lethal spike in violence in the country’s central states comes against a backdrop of escalating jihadist violence. Over the past seven days, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) has claimed at least eight attacks, primarily targeting the military and Christian communities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States.
Fuelled by the destruction of military positions and equipment, as well as rising numbers of casualties, the group’s current campaign has shown few signs of relenting. Like many militant groups in the region, ISWAP’s ability to conduct attacks is facilitated by porous borders. There will be hopes that ongoing rapprochement with neighbouring Niger can bolster bilateral and multinational security cooperation and curb the group’s violence.
Adding to the growing list of security challenges facing the country are new reports of violent activity in North Central Nigeria, perpetrated by an extremist group linked to Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS), commonly referred to as Boko Haram. On 16 April, members of the group, led by a notorious JAS commander known as Mahmouda, reportedly killed 15 people in Kemanji, Kwara State.
The militant group is said to have established a foothold in Kwara and neighbouring Niger State, slowly escalating its attacks and increasing territorial control - raising concerns about the emergence of another epicentre of violence in Nigeria's already fraught security landscape.
President Kiir Tightens Grip on Power amid Enduring Violence
On 21 April, the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), loyal to President Salva Kiir, recaptured the city of Nasir from the White Army, an ethnic militia with ties to First Vice President Riek Machar. The announcement came just days after the SSPDF regained control of the nearby town of Ulang, which had been under the control of the White Army and the armed wing of Machar’s party since 2013.
In early March, the White Army overran a military base in Nasir and captured the city, leading to numerous deaths, including that of a high-ranking SSPDF general. The attack ignited months of mounting tensions between President Kiir and his deputy, with the South Sudanese leader alleging that Machar had orchestrated the move.
The two men fought on opposing sides in South Sudan’s deadly civil war between 2013-2018; it was ended by a peace accord that saw the rivals enter a fragile power-sharing agreement. In the weeks following the attack on Nasir, South Sudan was plunged into turmoil by the power struggle between Kiir and Machar.
Vice President Machar has been under house arrest since 26 March, while many of his key political allies have also been detained by forces loyal to the current leader. It now seems that President Kiir, with support from the Ugandan government, has been making progress in his attempts to consolidate his power and usher South Sudan into a new political era.
Despite these ongoing efforts, the armed wing of the vice president’s party, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), vowed on 17 April “to use all means at its disposal” to prevent Machar from being replaced and prosecuted.
On 22 April, reports emerged that fighting between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO had occurred over recent days in parts of Central Equatoria and Jonglei States. These developments suggest that although President Kiir is increasingly likely to emerge as the victor in this decades-long power struggle, his opposition is unwilling to go down without a fight.