The Sub-Saharan Security Review
11 March - 18 March
The VDP’s Central Role in Burkina Faso’s Limitless Cycles of Violence
To combat the rapid proliferation of extremist groups, the civilian auxiliary force - Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) - was created in 2020 to fill the extensive gaps in security across Burkina Faso.
After assuming power in 2022, current leader, Ibrahim Traore, made the force a defining feature of his counterterrorism strategy and embarked on a mass recruitment drive.
The VDP’s tens of thousands of members hail from most of Burkina Faso’s ethnic groups, though most come from sedentary communities such as the Mossi, Foulse, Gourmantche, and Songhai. The Fulani - a predominantly pastoralist ethnic group - is notably absent from the force, however.
Typically receiving between just two or three weeks basic training before being armed and deployed to the frontline, the VDP have become favoured targets for jihadists.
The lethal threats facing the VDP have frequently led some to engage in acts of retaliatory violence against communities they perceive to be complicit.
The Fulani community has been persecuted by the government and state security forces long before the formation of the VDP, leading to their relative dominance in the ranks of terrorist groups in the Sahel.
The community’s overrepresentation in militant groups has seen them systematically targeted by ill-disciplined and often vengeful VDP.
Members of the government-allied militia have been accused of yet another atrocity against the Fulani community over the past week, allegedly killing dozens of civilians in villages near the city of Solezo between 10-11 March.
Footage circulating online shows dozens, including women and children, dead or dying with men wearing VDP uniforms in the background.
The brutality of these killings immediately drew the attention of international media outlets and human rights organisations, prompting the military government to refute the claims and condemn “the spread on social media of images inciting hatred and communal violence”.
The statement stands in stark contrast to the public reaction of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), with one of its highest ranking commanders in Burkina Faso responding via a five-minute-long video that denounced the VDP’s frequent killings of civilians.
The group pledged to get revenge for the persistent killings of civilians, regardless of their ethnic background, and even provided aid to the impacted communities.
Exemplifying how state violence has facilitated JNIM’s drastic expansion across Burkina Faso and the wider Sahel, the group has claimed "the orphans will be taken care of, and if they want to join the jihad when they are old enough, they would be at the forefront".
In the week following the massacres,JNIM has undoubtedly fulfilled its promise of revenge. The group has publicly claimed at least 12 attacks across the country, killing well over 100 soldiers, police officers, and VDP forces.
The al-Qaeda branch is now believed to be intentionally restricting its violence against civilians, while the government is showing little desire to reduce the frequent human rights abuses of its forces. Should these patterns of behaviour continue, the Burkinabe government will struggle to reverse the tide against the extremists.
External Forces Exacerbate Acute Tensions in South Sudan
Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, and Riek Machar, his First Vice President, have been key protagonists in much of South Sudan’s turmoil - both past and present.
In January, fighting broke out between the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF), the official state military force, and the military wing of Vice President Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) in Western Equatoria state.
This was soon followed by clashes between the SSPDF and an armed youth offshoot of the White Army - an ethnic militia with close ties to Machar’s SPLA/IO - in Upper Nile state.
The SSPDF alleges that the White Army and the SPLA/IO launched a major offensive in late February, to which it responded with airstrikes.
The White Army then captured a military base in Nasir, Upper Nile, prompting security forces loyal to President Kiir to arrest several of Machar’s close allies and surround his residence. Tensions were exacerbated after a UN helicopter was attacked evacuating SSPDF forces from Nasir, killing over 20 troops.
Although several of Machar’s allies have since been released, violence has continued. SSPDF airstrikes reportedly killed 21 people in Nasir on 17 March, just days after Defence Minister General Chol Thon Balok promised the strategic town would be retaken.
Later that day, the Kiir government ordered the White Army to withdraw from military zones in Nasir, threatening “necessary force” against them and affiliated forces unless they comply.
The government also admitted that the Ugandan military (UPDF) has been deployed to the country to ensure territorial integrity.
There are indications that the Kiir government has the backing of other external forces. Sudan War Monitor, a journalist and research outlet, reported on 18 March that over the weekend the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from neighbouring Sudan clashed with the Machar-affiliated SPLA/IO in Upper Nile state.
The violence erupted as hundreds of SPLA/IO fighters were allegedly returning from having collected weapons from the RSF’s rival - the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
The involvement of these two actors in one of the world’s most devastating contemporary crises threatens to markedly escalate hostilities in South Sudan.
The SAF has recently gained the upper hand in the Sudanese conflict; it is now pushing the RSF southward into Sudan’s Darfur and Sennar states, though the paramilitary force may also increasingly seek refuge in South Sudan.
The RSF is a notoriously brutal outfit, its full-entrance into the South Sudanese arena in support of President Kiir would be devastating. The government in Port Sudan will likely attempt to counter its influence by further backing the SPLA/IO and other forces affiliated with Machar.
With external actors adding fuel to the fire, along with reports that Machar’s party has recently withdrawn from key security and dialogue mechanisms that ended South Sudan’s civil war, the country is edging closer to another devastating war.
President Tshisekedi Seeks Talks as Violence Continues
Unwavering in its belief that M23 is a Rwandan proxy used to plunder its resource-rich eastern regions, the Congolese government had long been unwilling to directly engage with the rebels since they reemerged in late 2020.
But the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) have been continuously ceding swathes of territory in North and South Kivu provinces for almost three months now, significantly diminishing Kinshasa’s bargaining power.
Despite his position of weakness, reports last week that Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi had agreed to a summit with the Congo River Alliance (AFC) of rebel groups, all-but-headed by the M23, in Angola on 18 March came as a surprising development.
Tshisekedi's newfound willingness to negotiate with the rebels is likely driven by both developments in the capital and the east of the country. Indeed, Joseph Kaliba,Tshisekedi’s predecessor and president of the DRC from 2001-2019, has recently returned to the political scene.
Kabila has reportedly met with opposition politicians, reorganised his political party, and made preparations “for a return to business”. In late February he even labelled the current government a “tyrannical regime”.
Unsurprisingly, the former president’s actions have sparked concerns within the current government, which has claimed Kabila is manoeuvring in the shadows in support of M23.
While these are the type of accusations one may expect from a administration fearful of its position, reports that Kabila’s trip to the Ugandan capital, Kampala, last week coincided with that of Corneille Nangaa, leader of the AFC, suggests these fears may not be unfounded - even if it remains unclear if the pair met or not.
While Kabila may have recently met with Nangaa, M23’s de facto spokesperson, the rebel coalition later denied President Tshisekedi the opportunity, announcing its withdrawal less than 24 hours before the summit began in response to a wave of sanctions recently imposed by the EU.
In a surprising turn of events, President Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Qatar to discuss the escalating conflict in the eastern DRC on 18 March. The pair reportedly agreed on the need to continue talks “to establish a solid foundation for lasting peace.”
Despite the promising tone of these reports, violence is likely to persist in the DRC for the time being. A cessation in hostilities will require the participation of M23 / AFC. The rebel coalition’s absence from the Doha summit provides it a justification to continue waging war.
Somali President Survives Assassination Attempt as al-Shabaab Continue Offensive
On the morning of 18 March, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Government of Somalia, left the presidential palace for the capital’s international airport.
Shortly after the president’s departure, an improvised explosive device was detonated by the militant group al-Shabaab as the his convoy was passing through the Ceel-Gab neighbourhood.
Less than two weeks ago, the Somali president publicly denounced a security alert issued by the US, which warned that Mogadishu faced an imminent threat of terrorist attack.
The president survived the bombing, although several bystanders were killed. The damage one of the armoured vehicles in his convoy reportedly sustained suggests the extremist group came close to landing a devastating blow.
Al-Shabaab has maintained its intense offensive over the past week, expanding operations from Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle and encroaching further toward the federal capital into Lower Shabelle.
The militant group has launched a string of attacks on military bases and towns in the southern regions, some of which took place just 20 km from Mogadishu, reportedly killing scores of government-affiliated troops.
As the federal government struggles to counter the wave of violence being unleashed by the extremist group, Turkey, a country that holds deep ties to Mogadishu, sent two Turkish-made Akıncı drones to help repel al-Shabaab’s advances on the capital.
Adding to US and Ethiopian air power, the additional weapons systems - known for their advanced technology and endurance - will augment the capabilities of the federal government.
The arrival of these drones is unlikely to be decisive in the outcome of the ongoing violence, however, particularly as ground forces continue to be hampered by a list of systemic deficiencies.
Moreover, the chaotic implementation of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has created additional obstacles.
It has been noted that the withdrawal of Burundian troops from Somalia, a decision that came following disagreements over force composition, has left security vacuums in the Middle Shabelle region, where al-Shabaab has been particularly active.
The extremist group is likely to continue making gains in the region, as Ethiopia has expressed reluctance to commit troops to the frontlines due to reported concerns that doing so could give its regional foe, Egypt - scheduled to deploy forces in June - a strategic advantage.
Tensions Reduce in Tigray, Disinformation Adds to Challenges
Escalating tensions soared after a faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), led by Debretsion Gebremichael, seized control over several towns in Tigray, as well as parts of the capital, Mekele, last week. However, recent days have seen an uneasy stillness settle over the region.
Clashes erupted briefly in the town of Mekoni over the weekend, reportedly between forces loyal to Debretsion and those supporting his political rival, Getachew Reda, leading to several civilian casualties.
Despite teetering on the brink of a major conflict, that could potentially draw in Ethiopia and Eritrea, further hostilities in Tigray have yet to arise. Reports suggest that the Ethiopian Federal Government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and closely aligned with the Getachew faction, is seeking to negotiate a settlement to Tigray’s internal crisis.
Neighbouring Eritrea, whose rising tensions with Abiy reportedly led it to meet with the Debretsion faction of the TPLF on a number of occasions, has also reiterated it has no role in Tigray - further de-escalating the situation.
Ongoing negotiations are thought to be seeking a compromise that will be palatable for both feuding parties as well as the federal government.
The outcome of this precarious situation remains unclear, and the eruption of a major conflict should still not be ruled out. The range of stakeholders, motivations, and grievances means the crisis remains as complex as it is volatile.
One consistent trend in this saga is the widespread prevalence of disinformation on social media. Recent false claims have ranged from the removal of Getachew from his position as chairman of the Tigray Interim Administration to the deployment of Eritrean air defence systems along the border with Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s sizeable yet highly diverse population makes it susceptible to outbreaks of ethnic and political violence, but it makes the country vulnerable to disinformation and misinformation.
Authorities and non-state actors alike manipulate the information space to control the public narrative for self-serving purposes, fuelling the numerous conflicts raging across Ethiopia. The recent events in Tigray highlight a broader issue affecting Ethiopia, as well as societies across the globe.