The Sub-Saharan Security Review
8 July - 15 July
Weekly Summary:
Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama spoke with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, to discuss deepening the relationship between their countries. Ghana is reportedly seeking drones to improve security along its northern border.
At the age of 92, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya announced his candidacy for October’s election. While an eighth term cannot be ruled out, the long-serving leader faces numerous challenges and a victory would likely be highly contentious.
The death of former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari was announced on 13 July. The country’s security crisis that worsened under his leadership has continued under his successor, and shows few signs of abating without a fresh response.
A fifth round of peace talks between the DRC and M23/AFC took place in Qatar. The Congolese government arrested several military officials, prompting rumours of a coup plot. Violence, perpetrated by a range of actors, persists in the country’s east.
The RSF launched a major attack on the besieged city of el-Fasher. While it was pushed out by the SAF the following day, the assault demonstrates the paramilitary group remains undeterred in its desire to seize the city and and increase its control over the Darfur region.
Ghana Seeks Drone Capabilities from Ukraine
Russia and Ukraine were once key suppliers of wheat, fertiliser, and fuel for countries across Africa. Disrupting global supplies and leading to price increases, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had an almost immediate economic impact on millions across the continent - particularly its most vulnerable. The conflict has also seen Africa become an increasingly important theatre of contestation between the two belligerents, with Ukraine moving to counter Russia’s burgeoning influence on the continent.
Shortly after the onset of the Russia—Ukraine conflict, Kyiv assembled an official strategy to improve its standing in Africa. It has since opened eight new embassies, provided food aid, and offered countries military training and expertise. The results have been mixed, with many African states holding long-standing relations with Moscow, whose financial, military, and political muscle it cannot match.
Some of Russia’s closest allies are found in West Africa - namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger - however, support for the Kremlin is not unanimous across the sub-region, with countries like Ghana having publicly opposed its military campaign in Ukraine. On 11 July, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama spoke with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine. The two leaders discussed deepening their bilateral relationship and agreed to meet in person to further the partnership between their two nations.
In an official statement, the Ukrainian government noted that cooperation in the field of advanced technologies was a main point of discussion for the two leaders. The Mahama administration reportedly holds a strong interest in acquiring Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to bolster its ability to monitor and survey its northern border with the Sahel.
This would likely not be the first time Ukraine has exported its UAV capabilities to counter Russian influence in Africa. The Ukrainian military is widely-believed to have provided training and equipment to Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) rebels in northern Mali, who have used this technology on a number of occasions to conduct attacks against Russian and Malian security personnel. There has been speculation that some of this technology and know-how may have been passed on to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the same group attempting to infiltrate northern Ghana from the Sahel.
Nonetheless, the potential partnership could prove highly fruitful for Ghana, with the acquisition of this technology serving as an innovative means of stemming the proliferation of jihadists into the country. However, drones alone are not the sole solution for keeping JNIM at bay - particularly if the government is unable to address northern Ghana’s long-standing security and governance challenges.
Cameroon President Biya Announces Candidacy in October’s Election
President Paul Biya has ruled over Cameroon since 1982, assuming power following the surprise resignation of the country’s first-ever leader, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Biya was once known as an unassuming figure, seen by some as Ahidjo’s puppet. While he initially built his administration with his predecessor's approval - who believed he could maintain dominant influence as party chairman - Biya also quietly moved to concentrate power in his own hands.
In the summer of 1983, Biya reorganised his cabinet without Ahidjo’s knowledge, prompting a power struggle between the two men. After circumventing plots to overthrow him, purging the party of Ahidjo’s allies, and forcing the former president into exile, it was Biya who emerged victorious. The incumbent leader has since maintained a firm hold over Cameroon, and has successfully navigated attempts to transition the country to a more democratic form of governance.
Despite celebrating his 92nd birthday a little over five months ago, and reportedly suffering health difficulties last year, Paul Biya remains undeterred in his desire to remain in power. On 13 July, the president officially announced that he will seek re-election for an eighth term in October’s presidential vote. Allegations of irregularities and voter fraud have marred Cameroon’s elections for decades, suggesting yet another Biya victory is the most likely outcome.
Despite the odds being stacked heavily in President Biya’s favour, recent years have seen the leader confronted by numerous challenges. An almost decade-old secessionist rebellion in Cameroon’s English-speaking North-West and South-West regions continues to rage, while Islamist extremists remain a persistent, deadly threat in the Far North region. This enduring violence has affected President Biya’s popularity, while the government's repressive and authoritarian tendencies have done little to improve support.
In late June, two influential political figures and former allies separately announced they will be running in the upcoming election. The pair hold significant power in northern Cameroon, which they had mobilised in Biya’s support in previous elections. Other opposition figures, including 2018’s runner-up, have also announced their candidacy. This lack of a unified opposition will likely work in Biya’s favour; however, it remains to be seen if a society increasingly jaded by decades of his leadership is willing to accept an eighth victory for the ageing leader.
Nigeria’s Perennial Security Crisis
Former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari died in London on 13 July. Buhari, a former major general, first took power via a coup d’etat in 1983. Overthrown by a putsch less than two years later, Buhari’s first tenure was relatively short-lived. After retiring from the military, Buhari became a self-described “converted democrat” and a civilian politician. He returned to power in 2015 and is renowned for being the first opposition leader to defeat an incumbent.
After serving two four-year terms, Buhari was succeeded by current President Bola Tinubu in 2023. Figures from across the political spectrum have paid tribute to Buhari, despite his mixed legacy as a president. The former leader will be remembered for his attempts to reform Nigeria and tackle corruption, but also the violence and insecurity that deepened and permeated across the country under his stewardship.
And it appears likely that a failure to manage Nigeria’s security crisis will characterise President Tinubu’s reign, who like his predecessor, pledged to stabilise the situation. In the first two years of his leadership, at least 10,217 people were killed by Islamist extremists and bandits in Nigeria’s central and northern regions, according to Amnesty International.
Insecurity has worsened significantly in 2025, with it being reported that more people have been killed in the first six months of the year than in all of 2024. This uptick has been caused in part by a months-long campaign by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in northeast Nigeria, but also intercommunal violence in the country’s Middle Belt and rampaging bandits in its north-west and north-central states.
The Institute for Security Studies recently argued that the government’s response “has been reactive at best, and ineffective at worst”, and maintains that it “must make a concerted effort to revamp and deploy all instruments of national power – such as its army, police and a competent judiciary – to address violent crime”. Such a task is no small undertaking, yet this year’s skyrocketing levels of bloodshed underscores that the state’s current response is inadequate. Nigeria’s rampant insecurity costs lives and erodes state legitimacy, meaning an overhaul of the country’s security strategy must come soon.
Fresh Challenges and Enduring Violence in the DRC
Qatar-brokered peace talks between the Congolese government and the M23/Congo River Alliance (AFC) rebel coalition entered their fifth round over the past week. Washington is reportedly applying pressure to ensure a peace proposal is agreed within the coming days, in hopes of presenting a deal at a trilateral meeting between Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and US President Donald Trump later this month.
The M23/AFC coalition is said to be demanding the Congolese government end its support for all non-state armed groups, engage in inclusive dialogue, and release of figures accused of being linked to the group. Critical Threats reported on 11 July the rebels are also seeking de-facto control of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces - a move that would significantly reshape the region’s political, economic, and security landscapes.
Whether the Congolese government would be willing to essentially cede control over this valuable territory remains to be seen; such a move would likely be met with strong resistance within the DRC’s political circles. Signs of internal dissent against President Tshisekedi’s rule may have been found in the detention of several high-ranking military figures, including the former Chief of Staff General Christian Tshiwewe, on 8/9 July. While the motive behind these arrests remains unclear, some have claimed the men were linked to a coup plot. The government has remained conspicuously silent on this development.
On the frontline, the absence of a peace deal between the Congolese government and M23/AFC means fighting has persisted across North Kivu and South Kivu. M23 and the Rwandan military launched a major operation against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group whose dissolution Kigali made a core condition of its peace deal with Kinshasa.
Elsewhere, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) attacked several villages in the Walese Vonkutu chiefdom, North Kivu, between 8 and 10 July, killing at least 66 people. Troops participating in Operation Shujaa, a joint mission between the Ugandan and Congolese militaries, have recently been conducting a large-scale offensive against ISCAP strongholds in the Lolwa forest. The attacks in Walese Vonkutu have been described as a retaliation for this military operation.
RSF Assaults el-Fasher and Continues Attacks Against Civilians
Since taking power last year, President Trump has attempted to broker peace in the DRC, Ukraine, and the Middle East - achieving mixed results. However, as with much of the world, ending the conflict in Sudan has seemingly not been among the top priorities of the Trump administration. Nonetheless, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues at a lethal intensity.
The RSF’s offensive actions, against civilians and the SAF alike, are now primarily taking place in western Sudan, where it is attempting to shore up its control over Darfur and North Kordofan. RSF fighters reportedly killed between 200 and 300 civilians in several villages in North Kordofan on 14 July. In a now all-too-familiar pattern, the “targeted villages were completely empty of any military objectives”, according to an NGO.
The group made a further efforts to achieve a long-standing aim on 11 July, when, for the first time its siege began over a year ago, a substantial number of fighters entered el-Fasher. RSF fighters took control of several sites in the city and engaged in hours-long clashes with the SAF, resulting in casualties and destruction.
According to the SAF, this was the RSF’s 220th assault on el-Fasher. The paramilitary group was not pushed out beyond the city’s limits by the SAF until the following morning, though it reportedly suffered a high number of losses. Nonetheless, the recent operation once again underscored the RSF’s deep-rooted desire to capture the city, which comes under frequent attack. In control of four of Darfur’s five states, the fall of el-Fasher would come as a major victory for the RSF. However, the paramilitary group has yet to capture and hold key sites in city, suggesting it a major breakthrough is unlikely soon.